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In 2009, the UK government emphasised that it was “deeply committed” to the maintenance of the 
state’s social union, embodied in a single social security system. Five years later, the future of this 
social union appeared less certain than at any time since the 1920s. Dissatisfaction with the ‘welfare 
reform’ agenda of the coalition government was a driver of support for Scottish independence in the 
2014 referendum campaign. Meanwhile, the Northern Ireland Assembly failed to pass legislation to 
mirror the Welfare Reform Act 2012, normally a formality due to the convention of parity in social 
security; despite Westminster’s subsequent extension of the 2012 reforms to the region, divergence 
in secondary legislation remains likely. This article draws on the findings of qualitative interviews 
with politicians and civil servants in both regions during a period covering the conclusion of the Smith 
Commission’s work on the future of Scottish devolution and the height of a political impasse over 
Northern Ireland’s Welfare Reform Bill that threatened a constitutional crisis. It considers the extent 
to which steps towards divergence in the two devolved regions have altered the UK’s social union and 
to which the two processes have influenced one another.  
Research conducted under the supervision of Gráinne McKeever (School of Law) and Ann Marie 
Gray (School of Criminology, Politics and Social Policy) at Ulster University, with the support of a 
PhD fieldwork grant from the Socio-Legal Studies Association. Earlier versions were presented (as 
‘Social citizenship in the devolutionary state: a clash of law and politics?’) at the Socio-Legal 
Studies Association and (as ‘Devolved perspectives on the UK government’s welfare reform 
agenda: parallel or intertwined journeys?’) Social Policy Association annual conferences, 2015. 
Thanks to Ciara Fitzpatrick (Ulster) and the journal’s anonymous reviewers for their useful 
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Introduction 
The social security reforms of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition represent a milestone in 
the evolution of social citizenship in the UK. These further advanced a long term project whereby 
access to a minimum standard of living is increasingly contingent on labour market participation. 
Meanwhile, the hostile devolved-level reaction to UK government policy points to the continuation 
of a process ongoing since the institution of devolution in 1998, whereby the manner in which the 
social rights of citizenship are realised, and perhaps the nature of those rights, varies between 
regions. The highest profile manifestation of the latter could be seen in the 2014 referendum on 
Scottish independence, in which questions of citizens’ welfare and disquiet with the welfare reform 
agenda featured prominently in secessionist rhetoric (Mooney and Scott, 2015). Following voters’ 
rejection of independence, the UK government has begun to act on commitments to devolve 
additional powers in fields including “welfare” (Clegg, 2014). At the same time, concerns about 
Westminster policy in Northern Ireland have underpinned the most serious challenge yet to the 
parity convention, under which that region, despite devolved competence for social security, 
imitates provision in Great Britain.  
This article explores changes to the social union following the Welfare Reform Act 2012, building on 
regionalisation of social citizenship since 1998. Section 1 outlines the position of social security as a 
rare field of social policy relatively unaffected by devolution and identifies the 2012 Act as a turning 
point. Section 2 then examines the extent to which reactions to coalition policy in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, and the resulting changes to the devolution settlement, have been mutually 
influential or driven by region-specific considerations, as well as the continued ability of the UK 
government to shape policy in the devolved regions. Section 3 asks whether the drive for greater 
autonomy results as much from ‘welfare nationalism’ as from objections to the 2012 reforms, before 
section 4 emphasises the continued uncertainty regarding future shape of the social union and the 
place of social security therein. 
The study on which the article draws explores the attitudes of key members of the policy community 
in two devolved regions to social citizenship and social security at a critical point in the development 
of the devolution settlement. 36 politicians and civil servants, drawn from the five main political 
parties in the two devolved legislatures and from government departments or directorates with an 
interest in social security, citizens’ welfare or finance, took part in semi-structured interviews. 
Individuals with knowledge of relevant issues and who might be expected to play a role in decision-
making on the future locus of competence for social security and subsequent policy were targeted. 
Nineteen interviewees came from Northern Ireland and 17 from Scotland; 18 were politicians, of 
whom eight represented pro-union parties, nine nationalist parties and one a party neutral on the 
constitutional issue; 18 were civil servants.  Fieldwork was completed between November 2014 and 
February 2015, coinciding with talks between the Northern Ireland parties that briefly promised to 
allow the region’s Welfare Reform Bill to complete a legislative journey stalled since February 2013 
(NIO, 2014) and publication of the UK government’s proposals for the future of Scottish devolution. 
Data analysis was guided by Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) constant comparative method and 
Charmaz’s (2006) constructivist grounded method.  
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1. Social citizenship, the social union and devolution 
Social citizenship may be summarised as the citizen’s right to a minimum standard of living, the 
state’s obligation to fulfil “normative expectations about how the basic requirements of… personal 
welfare and development can be met” (Harris, 2013: 4) Marshall, credited with coining the term, is 
widely associated with a national view of citizenship, wherein responsibility for the definition and 
realisation of the individual’s civil, political and social rights lies with the nation state (Mooney and 
Williams, 2006; Keating, 2009). If social rights were to be “exercised by all citizens equally,” it 
followed that they should be national in application and realised with a high degree of uniformity by 
a national welfare state (McLean et al, 2013: 107). Wincott (2006) argues that in the UK the myth of 
a perfectly unitary welfare state was never matched by reality. Such a perspective appears 
particularly dated in an era of multi-level governance, when social entitlements may be defined and 
realised at “different territorial scales” (Lodge and Trench, 2014: 10) – the state, a supranational 
body such as the European Union or a subnational territory (Faist, 2001). 
The impact of devolution on the rights of citizenship has been particularly evident in the social 
realm. Devolved functions are so dominated by social policy competences that the regional 
legislatures may be characterised as “social policy parliament[s]” (Birrell, 2009: 13; 2010). If regional 
differences in electorates’ social policy preference appear to be limited (Curtice and Ormston, 2011; 
Henderson et al, 2013; Mitchell, 2014), where elites’ policy preferences differ from those of the UK 
government devolution provides an opportunity to legislate accordingly. Post-1998 divergence is 
well documented (Birrell, 2010), which some claim has resulted in the emergence of “a particularly 
Scottish [or Welsh, or Northern Irish] welfare state” (Mooney and Poole, 2004: 477). Whether this 
results from innovation at regional level or “refusal to pursue some of the UK government’s more 
radical policy initiatives” (McEwen, 2005) varies from case to case.  
While devolution has undoubtedly altered the social union, the major exception has been social 
security. Competence is reserved to the UK government for all of Great Britain, although 
centralisation is being eroded (SSAC, 2015; Scotland Bill). The position in Northern Ireland is more 
complex: full devolved competence since 1921 has resulted in almost no deviation from policy in 
Great Britain. Devolved governments anxious to “preserve the same standard of living… as prevails 
on the other side” of the Irish Sea (Craig, 1925) have, with minor exceptions, provided identical cash 
benefits under near-identical conditions (Simpson, 2015). This practice – the parity convention – has 
been financially supported by the UK government since 1926, by which stage, only five years after 
devolution, provision of equivalent social protection from regional revenues had become 
unsustainable in what remains an economically weaker region (Lawrence, 1965). Today, the 
Treasury subsidises contributory benefits and fully funds non-contributory benefits in Northern 
Ireland outside the block grant from which other devolved services are funded, at a cost of £3.2 
billion in 2012-13 (HMRC, 2013; DSD, 2013). Although constitutional legislation merely requires the 
Minister responsible for social security in Northern Ireland to “consult” the Secretary of State “with a 
view to securing that, to the extent agreed between them, the legislation… provides single systems 
of social security, child support and pensions for the United Kingdom” (Northern Ireland Act 1998 
s87(1)), prior to 2012 uniformity remained all but absolute, with parity seen to serve Northern 
Ireland’s financial interests (Birrell and Gray, 2014). 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in the Journal of Social 
Policy following peer review. The definitive published version (M Simpson, ‘The social union after the coalition: 
devolution, divergence and convergence’ (2016) JSP: FirstView article is available online through Cambridge 
Journals. 
Events since 2012 have shaken the status quo. The coalition government of 2010 to 2015 continued 
an ongoing project to cast paid employment as the primary route to economic security and 
jobseeking as the key manifestation of reciprocity in the welfare state (Larkin, 2011) alongside a new 
drive to reduce social security expenditure (Stephens, 2015). Key reforms include the deepening and 
widening of jobseeking conditionality for claimants, stiffening of financial sanctions for non-
compliance, reduced generosity of out-of-work benefits, increased in-work support for some 
claimants and the unification of a range of social assistance benefits within a single universal credit. 
Meanwhile, the main disability benefit, disability living allowance, is being replaced by a new 
personal independence payment, less generous to many claimants and for which at least 20% fewer 
people are projected to be eligible (Harris, 2014). Despite its statement (under a previous 
administration) that it was “deeply committed” to the maintenance of a single system of social 
security as an integral part of the social union (Scotland Office, 2009: 4), the UK government has also 
withdrawn from the provision of discretionary welfare and council tax support, transferring 
responsibility to local and regional governments (SSAC, 2015). 
Parties represented in devolved governments have been among the most vocal critics of the 
coalition agenda. The Scottish National Party (2013) adopted a position of opposition to the 
“catastrophic” Westminster policies and the ‘yes’ campaign stated prior to the referendum that it 
was “very likely that some of these measures would be among the first to be reversed on 
independence” (Yes Scotland, year unknown). Proposals for social security post-independence 
included specific short-term departures from UK policy and a long-term vision for a radically 
different welfare state (Expert Working Group, 2014). Following the prominence of questions of 
welfare in its broad sense as well as the narrower issue of welfare reform in the referendum 
campaign, plans were published for devolved control of disability benefits and aspects of universal 
credit (HMG, 2015; Scotland Bill). While devolution of power does not guarantee divergence will 
follow, the Scottish government will have the opportunity to adopt distinctive policies in some areas.  
Northern Ireland’s devolved competence for social security means politicians there are not limited 
to expressing their disapproval with UK government policy; the previous practice of swiftly 
replicating Westminster legislation was not followed for the 2012 Act. Although an equivalent Bill 
was introduced to the Assembly in October 2012, following a critical committee report (Committee 
for Social Development, 2013) disagreement among the Executive parties on the extent to which 
Northern Ireland should diverge from the legislation for Great Britain resulted in a two-year delay in 
the legislative process and ultimate defeat of the Bill in May 2015 (Hansard, 2015). Following this 
apparent abandonment of parity, primary legislation would be swiftly and substantially brought back 
into line with Great Britain through the short-term transfer of social security competences to 
Westminster (Welfare Reform (Northern Ireland) Order 2015). Nonetheless, previously agreed 
points of divergence have not all disappeared. The 2015 Order provides for a shorter maximum 
sanction period than in Great Britain and the Executive will fund a four-year disapplication of the 
housing benefit size criteria for social tenants (‘bedroom tax’), alter payment arrangements for 
universal credit and introduce other mitigating measures (NIO, 2015). The Welfare Reform 
Mitigations Working Group (2016) has recommended supplementary payments, mainly limited to 
one year’s duration, to claimants who lose money due to changes to disability benefits, employment 
and support allowance or (if they have dependent children) the household benefit cap. Since these 
measures are largely short term, the extent to which the Assembly’s recent reluctance to import 
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wholesale reforms made at Westminster sets a new precedent for social security policymaking 
remains to be seen. 
2. Policy learning or innovation? Drivers of divergence and 
convergence 
Decentralisation of political power provides the opportunity for policy divergence in fields of 
devolved competence. However, if policy experiments conducted in regional “laboratories of 
democracy” (Keating and Cairney, 2012: 239) are deemed successful, they may be imitated or 
adopted in revised form in other regions (Birrell, 2010). A relevant example is the implementation of 
regional social assistance schemes across Spain’s autonomous communities following experiments in 
Navarre and the Basque Country in the 1980s (Arriba and Moreno, 2005). That such a process of 
policy learning is taking place in respect of social security in Scotland and Northern Ireland may be 
suggested by the similarities between the departures from UK government policy Scotland is to be 
empowered to make and those proposed by the Northern Ireland Executive, especially in respect of 
universal credit. In asymmetric devolution settlements, desire to copy a given policy, or simply to 
‘keep up’ with one’s neighbours, may also drive demand for additional delegated powers (Hombrado 
Martos, 2008). This clearly applies to Scotland, where significant divergence from UK government 
social security policy requires new devolved competences.  
Sufficient similarity exists in the new social security competences to be devolved to Scotland and the 
divergences from UK government policy proposed in Northern Ireland at the point of the fieldwork 
to raise the question of whether the two regions were consciously learning from one another. 
Ministerial commitments in Northern Ireland’s foresaw fortnightly (instead of monthly) universal 
credit payments, splitting of payments between joint-claimant couples, direct payment of the 
housing element of the benefit to landlords and disapplication of the social sector size criteria in 
some circumstances (Storey, 2014). Scotland’s new powers will allow it to make similar changes, and 
any other changes it wishes to the housing element, but not to alter the sanctions regime, which will 
be slightly softened in Northern Ireland. Outside universal credit, devolved competence for the main 
disability benefits will allow Scotland, if it wishes, to imitate (or go further than) the minor changes 
to personal independence payment proposed in Northern Ireland. However, creating an equivalent 
to the supplementary payment fund for many continuing claimants who lose money as a result of 
various reforms, which was at the heart of the dispute that brought down the Welfare Reform Bill in 
May 2015 but survives in some form in the recommendations of the Mitigations Working Group 
(2016),1 will not be possible. Scotland’s power to create new benefits will be limited to replacement 
of the devolved disability benefits, one-off discretionary payments and council tax support (see 
Devolution (Further Powers) Committee, 2015). 
Northern Irish interviewees were particularly likely to conclude that opposition to the ‘welfare 
reform’ agenda there and in Scotland had been intertwined rather than parallel. Despite the 
constraints imposed by traditional adherence to parity and economic dependence, Northern Ireland 
was widely claimed to be building a better approach to social security than the UK government. 
                                                          
1
 A dispute as to whether the fund should also top up the incomes of new claimants was the main reason for 
the Bill’s legislative failure (Sinn Féin, 2015) 
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Hence some considered Scottish policymakers “would give their eye teeth for the kind of flexibilities 
we’ve got” (civil servant, NI) and see Northern Ireland as a role model as they contemplate use of 
their new powers. The Smith Commission’s proposals for further devolved powers, therefore, had 
been directly influenced by recognition that “there were aspects of the Northern Ireland package of 
measures which would give Scotland a great deal of flexibility” (civil servant, NI). In Scotland, 
although there was widespread evidence of appetite to learn from Northern Ireland’s experience of 
social security devolution, the lesson learned more often seemed to be of how not to do things than 
the contrary. Even a politician who considered the then-proposed “tweaks” to Northern Ireland’s 
Welfare Reform Bill “very sensible” believed that “we need something rather more than that.” Other 
MSPs were more forthright in their view that “things aren't working too well in Northern Ireland,” 
which had found itself in a “trap of it appearing that you have power over these things, but if you 
don't do what you're told it ends up costing you a lot of money.” 
If views as to the influence of Northern Ireland on Scotland were mixed, some Northern Irish 
interviewees believed learning has occurred in the opposite direction. In general terms, the 
referendum was depicted as “a great eye-opener… for us and Wales” (politician, NI) with potential 
to kick-start a wider conversation about the distribution of powers between tiers of government. A 
politician frustrated at the perceived reluctance of others to diverge from the 2012 Act spoke 
approvingly of Scotland’s early attempts to “alleviate the burden on people” despite its limited 
powers. Divergence in Scotland, then, might set an example for Northern Ireland. For many 
interviewees, Northern Irish policy would not be freely chosen by the Assembly, but “signed off” 
(civil servant, NI) by the UK government. From this perspective, the Smith proposals were seen to 
have potential to shape outcomes and perhaps a “different form of parity” (civil servant, NI) – if 
power to make a particular tweak to universal credit is offered to Scotland, the likelihood must 
increase that a similar change “might be part of the package” (civil servant, NI) in Northern Ireland. 
Certainly, non-implementation of the ‘bedroom tax’ might be interpreted as an example of policy 
learning from Scotland, where discretionary housing payments have been used to negate its 
financial impact on claimants.  
Although parallels can be seen between proposals for divergence in Northern Ireland and new 
powers in Scotland, the two are not mirror images. Further, although dissatisfaction with a common 
UK approach to social security has been voiced in a similar timeframe in both regions, it emerges 
from different environments. Both are devolved regions of the UK and have governments composed 
at least in part of nationalist/secessionist parties. However, the structure of government differs. 
While the Scottish government has only ever been composed of one or two parties, Northern 
Ireland’s five-party coalition is a potential obstacle to the development of a distinctive regional 
approach to any area of policy as its ideologically divergent members seek a “lowest common 
denominator” (Gray and Birrell, 2012). Whereas Scottish politics are frequently characterised as 
ideologically to the left of the UK as a whole, those of Northern Ireland are seen to be dominated by 
questions of ethno-religious identity rather than public policy (Greer, 2005; McEwen, 2005), within a 
broadly socially conservative ideological landscape (Racciopi and O’Sullivan-See, 2001; Deiana, 
2013). Fiscal positions, too, differ dramatically. Scotland’s per capita tax take was the highest in the 
UK in 2012-13 after North Sea revenues are taken into account and only 2.7% below average 
excluding this income, with expenditure the following year 15% higher than average. Per capita 
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revenues in Northern Ireland were 23% below the UK average and expenditure 23% higher (Adam 
and Miller, 2013; Keep, 2015). 
This picture of two neighbours with much in common but important differences was reflected in the 
findings. Although Scottish interviewees did not wish to “overstate” (politician, Scotland) the extent 
to which their region could be described as “more socialist” (politician, Scotland; civil servant, 
Scotland) than England, the most common comparator, it was common ground among most that a 
distinctive ideology of social citizenship could be identified. While this did not diverge fundamentally 
from the UK government’s view that paid employment should act as the “best route out of poverty” 
(Child Poverty Unit, 2009: 12), it was widely believed that a Scottish approach would afford higher 
priority to “fair work” paid at a “living wage” (numerous Scottish interviewees) while taking a more 
understanding, less punitive view of claimants. In Northern Ireland, it was suggested that the 
dominance of the parity convention in social security and of the national question in party politics 
has meant the polity has “never given much thought… as to what they believe social welfare should 
fulfil” (civil servant, NI). Although the 2012 Act had forced engagement with the issue, the 
fragmented nature of politics was seen as a major barrier to the development of “a political vision 
for the future for Northern Ireland” (civil servant, NI) in any field. Nonetheless, a regional ideology of 
welfare could be detected, again dominated by the workerist view but with a greater tendency to 
endorse the use of “some kind of stick” or “cutting back on benefits” (civil servants, NI) to motivate 
claimants who “don’t want to work” (politician, NI).  
Interviewees pointed to specific social and economic circumstances in Scotland and Northern Ireland 
that both provided evidence for the unsuitability of coalition policy and differentiated the two 
regions from each other. The social sector size criteria in housing benefit and the new personal 
independence payment were key points of contention with the UK government agenda. While the 
‘bedroom tax’ was portrayed as ill-suited to both regions due to lack of smaller units, reflecting Gibb 
(2013), several Scottish interviewees referred to a distinctive philosophy of social housing as 
“permanent homes” with, in contrast to England, “no real stigma… about renting your house” 
(politician, Scotland).  Those in Northern Ireland highlighted the region’s ethno-religious residential 
segregation, arguing that no one should be expected to move to smaller accommodation if that 
meant moving to an area where they might face intimidation (see Gray et al, 2009). Similarly, while 
interviewees noted high levels of disability in both regions (NISRA, 2012; National Records of 
Scotland, 2013) – a key reason for the high projected economic impact of welfare reform in 
Northern Ireland (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013) – those in the latter saw this as a legacy of political 
conflict from the 1960s, those in Scotland as an issue for any ex-industrial area. 
Policy learning can be top-down as well as horizontal. Northern Ireland’s social security legislation 
has historically been closely modelled on that for Great Britain. The resolution of the region’s 
welfare reform impasse through the temporary transfer of powers to Westminster will allow the 
extension not only of most of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 but of the social security provisions of 
the Welfare Reform and Work Bill to the region. This step was taken in the face of what some 
Ministers claimed were overwhelming financial pressures (Hamilton, 2015), demonstrating the 
potential for top-down “coercive transfer” of policy (Keating et al, 2012: 292) despite formal 
devolution of competence. Literature on devolution in Spain suggests the funding of a specific 
devolved service through ring-fenced grants from central government, as with social security in 
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Northern Ireland, greatly constrains policy autonomy in practice (Subirats and Gallego, 2002). That 
Scotland in 2012 and Northern Ireland in 2016 found space for some regional ‘mitigations’ in the 
regional operation of policy largely shaped by the UK government shows that in practice it can be 
difficult to definitively characterise a field of policy as a straightforward example of either divergence 
or convergence. 
In 1926, extraordinary transfers from the UK Exchequer were necessary to enable Northern Ireland 
to continue to model social security provision on that for Great Britain. Today, when interview data 
and parliamentary debates demonstrate that the merits of the Great Britain model are less readily 
accepted, the region’s weak fiscal position is presented as the primary obstacle to divergence. Media 
coverage of the “welfare reform crisis” frequently focused on the erroneously named “fines” 
(Boland, 2015) that would be incurred as a result of non-replication of the 2012 reforms as the extra 
costs associated with an unreformed policy were recovered by the Treasury from the block grant. 
Most interviewees in Northern Ireland agreed that it is no more able to fund its own social security 
provision outside the parity arrangement than in 1926. So while a civil believed that but for the 
“financial issue” there would be no “appetite for the Westminster solutions” among any of the 
Northern Irish parties, the “financial issue” remains at the heart of social security policymaking. This 
perspective was shared by some interviewees in Scotland, where a civil servant observed that the 
Treasury has Northern Irish policymakers in a “straitjacket” (civil servant, Scotland). So while 
interviewees in Northern Ireland were no less critical of the UK government’s changes to disability 
benefits, they did not echo the calls made by many of their Scottish counterparts for the retention 
for the time being of disability living allowance at devolved level and subsequent development of a 
region-specific benefit.  
In Scotland, a clear top-down driver of convergence will continue to exist given that much of social 
security policy will remain under Westminster control throughout Great Britain; fields to be 
devolved account for just 25% of non-pension spending (HMG, 2015). Where competence is 
devolved, the claim of some civil servants that a distinctive “Scottish model” of policy development 
exists, based on close engagement with Scottish stakeholders, might imply a degree of insulation 
from external influence. Nonetheless, the question of whether fiscal considerations might constrain 
capacity to diverge remains relevant. Some Northern Irish interviewees believed that had the 
referendum produced a different result, “Scotland might’ve been able to survive on its own” (civil 
servant, NI) economically in a way that Northern Ireland could not. Others felt that following the 
Scotland Bill, “I would be very, very surprised if they done anything in terms of deviation from UK 
welfare policy” (civil servant, NI) due to the costs involved. A similar range of views emerged in 
Scotland. More optimistic interviewees pointed to the steps taken to mitigate the impact of the 
‘bedroom tax’ as evidence that it is better placed to absorb the impact of divergence, albeit that the 
£55 million spent in 2014-15 is less than half the annual amount allocated to mitigations by 
Stormont from 2016 (Berry, 2014; NIO, 2015). In many cases, aspirations to social security 
divergence were inseparable from a desire for greater autonomy in fiscal and economic policy. A civil 
servant suggested the Scottish government believed a fiscally autonomous Scotland, “no longer… 
shackled by Westminster policies,” would experience an economic boom capable of supporting a 
radically different approach to social security. Others argued that even if the ‘yes’ campaign had 
hinted that an independent Scotland might offer more generous social security, “at no point did they 
suggest that it was possible to have a higher budget” (politician, Scotland). In the context of full fiscal 
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autonomy, some felt, recent falls in oil prices would have rendered even maintenance of current 
benefit levels challenging. 
3. Welfare reform and welfare nationalism 
If provision for citizens’ economic welfare is the hallmark of the nation state (McLean et al, 2013), it 
follows that those who claim the status of ‘nation’ for their sub-state region should aspire to 
devolved control of the necessary policy fields. Social policy divergence since 1998 has at times been 
associated with a ‘welfare nationalist’ project to emphasise solidarity at regional, rather than 
national, level (Mooney and Poole, 2004). The prominence of secessionist parties in the drive for 
new devolved competences for social security and divergence from the UK government approach 
raises the possibility that this process may be a manifestation of welfare nationalism whose purpose 
is as much to weaken the social and political unions as to devise a better policy at regional level. 
Welfare unionism and nationalism have a complicated history in Northern Ireland, the UK’s “most 
intractable territorial problem” (Carmichael, 1996: 413). While social security parity has been 
explicitly linked with unionism (Lundy, 1996), unionist parties have also driven social policy 
divergence (Gosling, 2008; Thomson, 2013). In 2015 interviewees there made little attempt to 
portray positions on the maintenance of parity as shaped by national aspirations. Politicians tended 
to present themselves as committed devolutionists and seemed willing to accept the same of their 
opponents. Civil servants, although convinced of parity’s financial importance, also argued (although 
not unanimously) that the ability to “tweak” UK government policy is advantageous. Nonetheless, 
unionists and nationalists’ perspective as to how far parity might be pushed tended to differ. Even if 
not “ideologically wedded” to the convention, unionists tended to consider it “naïve” to suggest the 
region could be “exempted” from processes taking place in all other UK regions, or to believe that 
social security, even if to some extent “tailored for Northern Ireland,” should “by and large” mirror 
Great Britain. This position is perhaps reflected in the approach of the Democratic Unionist Party, 
the largest in the Assembly, of opposing successive social security Bills at Westminster while senior 
members appear hesitant about endorsing divergence at Stormont. Nationalists tended to advocate 
more significant divergence, with one politician arguing it was disingenuous to stress the 
opportunities for ‘flexibility’ devolved competence allows while having a “cowering attitude” 
towards confrontation with central government. Nationalists were similarly accused of disingenuity, 
with some interviewees claiming Sinn Féin’s position was shaped less by the best interests of 
Northern Ireland than by the need for consistency with an oppositional, anti-austerity platform in 
the Republic of Ireland. 
The view that positions on social security devolution and divergence are “bound up with the politics 
and aspirations of independence” (civil servant, Scotland) was more openly expressed in Scotland – 
usually as a means of criticising political opponents. Hence for one politician, “most people in the 
SNP, although they I'm sure they do sympathise with better welfare benefits… they're always just an 
argument… to further independence.” Another highlighted the Scottish government’s initial 
prevarication around mitigation of the ‘bedroom tax’ because (it was claimed) Ministers thought 
they could gain more politically by “weaponising” the issue in the independence debate than by 
“protect[ing] the Scottish people.” That key aspects of social security were considered by unionists 
to be “intrinsic to the make-up of the social union” (politician, Scotland) and therefore unsuitable for 
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devolution was common ground. This position came in for criticism on the basis that “there's a 
whole host of areas where… social provision is not the same in different parts of the UK,” and 
therefore no objective reason why uniformity in social security must be maintained. Unionism could 
therefore be an obstacle to a “fairer” approach. One politician, who warned any break-up of the 
UK’s “intertwined” taxation and welfare structures must result in the emergence of “contradictions 
and tensions” whose outcome for the union could not be predicted, appeared wary of lending 
ammunition to this argument. Despite these misgivings, this interviewee expressed willingness to 
“actually use the powers that are coming… that could actually erode the constitutional settlement” if 
this meant better outcomes for people in Scotland.  
4. The way ahead: an enduring settlement? 
The command paper on the future of Scottish devolution after the referendum purports to provide a 
blueprint for An enduring settlement for the region within the union. Developments since the 
fieldwork suggest this is unlikely to be the case. The 2015 Labour manifesto advocated additional 
devolved powers, while even Conservative voices (BBC News, 2015) lend weight to the view of a 
Scottish politician that “we're in flux at the moment and we still have to find a stable solution.” In 
Northern Ireland, despite the temporary transfer of power to Westminster, the 2015 Order is not an 
exact replica of the 2012 Act and further mitigations will follow (NIO, 2015); how firmly parity has 
been reinstated remains to be seen. 
That “the campaign that happened before the [referendum] continues after it” (politician, Scotland) 
was reflected in the findings. Interviewees variously criticised Scotland’s proposed new powers as 
insufficient, noted the devolved government’s (2015) dissatisfaction with the command paper or 
simply mocked its title. In the medium term, most Scottish interviewees aspired to the devolution of 
additional social security powers. Full control of out-of-work benefits was top of the wish-list, being 
thought necessary to improve “outcomes for people who are in receipt of these benefits” (civil 
servant, Scotland) and, in tandem with more fiscal powers, to pursue the Scottish government’s 
objectives of a strong economy and social justice. Dissenters highlighted the merits of “pool[ing] 
your resources” (politician, Scotland) against social risk across the UK’s larger economic base, 
necessitating pooled decision making. Nor was more radical change necessarily thought to be off the 
agenda. A Northern Irish politician thought if “devo max… doesn’t work I think Scots may well call a 
referendum sooner rather than later and the yes vote will win.” Some Scottish politicians similarly 
saw future prospects for independence as more dependent on the ability of the “UK establishment” 
to adapt to the rise of the politics of regionalism than on events in Scotland itself.  
The question of whether and how Northern Ireland will move on from the parity convention is 
complicated by lack of consensus among interviewees as to how the convention has actually 
functioned. A number noted that the key question of whether the subvention since 1926 facilitates 
or requires equivalence of provision with Great Britain has never been answered. If the extent to 
which Northern Ireland must ape every aspect of UK government social security policy can be 
questioned, the core principle “that an individual here in Northern Ireland should receive the same 
level of benefit, subject to the same conditions, as an individual elsewhere in the UK” (McCausland, 
2013: 2) had not been seriously tested in the political arena until the current period. Even if parity 
has moved from near-absolute uniformity to a situation in which “you can do whatever tweaks you 
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so desire provided that (a) you can pay for them and (b) you can operationally deliver them” (civil 
servant, NI), the curbs placed on autonomy by financial considerations should not be 
underestimated. Further social security cuts (HM Treasury, 2015) will further reduce the expenditure 
the Treasury will directly fund in Northern Ireland and would therefore have increased the cost to 
the regional budget of an unreformed system. The Welfare Reform and Work Bill, tabled after the 
fieldwork, may therefore have pushed the regional parties towards agreement on a reform package 
that will largely bring Northern Ireland back into line with Great Britain. A Scottish civil servant’s 
prediction that “it's not impossible to envisage a situation where [social security] becomes a sort of 
running political issue in the north” may not be truly tested until the Assembly is called upon to 
decide whether to imitate Westminster’s next set of reforms. As the Treasury will no more subsidise 
costlier provision in Scotland than in Northern Ireland, debates as to which innovations are 
affordable and disputes with the UK government as to how costs or savings associated with an 
alternative policy should be calculated may equally become a feature of the Scottish landscape. 
Whether or not developments in Scotland and Northern Ireland have been intertwined up to this 
point, many interviewees expressed a desire for closer relationships in the future, including greater 
sharing of “knowledge and experience of what different approaches are being tried” (politician, 
Scotland). Some felt the dilution of the parity convention in Northern Ireland and partial devolution 
of competence to Scotland mean social security “is no longer reserved or devolved, it's a shared set 
of responsibilities across the governments” (civil servant, Scotland).  A Northern Irish politician 
suggested that given the dominance in practice of the centre, the devolved regions should aim to 
play a “meaningful role” from the earliest stages of UK government policy development. With 
Spicker’s (2015) warning of the potential for conflict between tiers of government as the Smith 
Commission’s recommendations on social security devolution are implemented reflected in some 
interviewees’ description of relations, it is unsurprising that a Scottish civil servant thought a new 
era of intergovernmental working would require “a big cultural change… in Whitehall in particular.” 
Whether anything resembling a partnership of equals in this way is feasible when the UK 
government holds the purse strings, likely to remain the case in Northern Ireland at least, can be 
questioned. 
Conclusion 
Although the UK was never marked by an absolute uniformity of social policy across its component 
regions, devolution in 1998 has unquestionably changed the character of the social union. The major 
exception (along with shared taxation systems), has been social security, but here, too, change has 
been in the air since 2012. The UK government’s pursuit of controversial reforms at a time when the 
forthcoming Scottish referendum meant the advantages of the union to the country’s component 
regions were already under scrutiny has been a catalyst both the pursuit of new competences in 
Scotland and an unprecedented challenge to the parity convention in Northern Ireland. Significant 
regional differences in social protection, therefore, have seemed a realistic prospect as never before.  
Devolved governments do not exist in a vacuum; the contemporaneous emergence of challenges to 
a common UK social security policy in Scotland and Northern Ireland and the similarities between 
the divergences proposed in Northern Ireland and the new powers to be devolved to Scotland 
suggest a degree of policy learning. Interviewees in Northern Ireland were certainly receptive to this 
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point of view, with many arguing that proposed deviations from UK government policy in that region 
had influenced the Smith Commission’s proposed division of social security competences for 
Scotland, a slightly smaller number suggesting learning had mainly occurred in the opposite 
direction. Scottish interviewees were undoubtedly eager to learn from Northern Ireland’s longer 
experience of social security devolution, but rather than wishing to imitate their neighbours across 
the North Channel tended to see it as a warning that formal devolved competences do not always 
deliver significant policy autonomy in practice – a situation they were eager to avoid. The difficulty in 
achieving political agreement on divergence in Northern Ireland, and its ultimately limited extent, 
emphasise the continued potential for top-down policy transfer in devolved fields, even when 
misgivings exist about the UK government agenda. Although Scottish interviewees were for the most 
part confident that their region would be better placed to resist similar pressures, such claims 
cannot really be tested before implementation of the Scotland Bill. Whether the messy end to 
Northern Ireland’s welfare reform saga is indicative of a reassertion of the parity convention, largely 
on the basis of financial necessity, or a temporary truce until the next major reform from 
Westminster likewise can only be guessed at present. 
Despite the role played by secessionist parties in voicing discontent with UK government policy, 
interviewees’ depictions of the role of “welfare nationalism” differed significantly. In Scotland, a 
sharp divide emerged among political interviewees, who either accused nationalists of fanning the 
flames of discontent with the ‘welfare reform’ agenda mainly to generate support for independence, 
or claimed unionists’ obsession with maintaining the social and political unions meant adherence to 
a set of policies contrary to the interests of citizens. Such debates are likely to be reprised in future 
calls for further devolved social security competences to be added to those proposed in an 
‘enduring’ settlement that few thought likely to endure long. That policy preferences could be 
shaped by positions on the national question was also acknowledged in Northern Ireland, but here 
interviewees were less eager to accuse opponents of allowing their approach to be determined thus, 
even if there was a clear unionist-nationalist divide as to how extensively the region might diverge 
from Great Britain. Here, more clearly than in Scotland, aspirations to genuine autonomy in social 
security are likely to continue to be tempered by fiscal dependence on the Treasury. The social union 
remains in a state of flux and the ultimate outworkings of the forces unleashed in 2012 will only 
gradually become clear. 
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